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KEEP SECURITIES REFORM MOVING:
ELIMINATE THE SEC’S INTEGRATION DOCTRINE
Stuart R. Cohn*

I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE

Small businesses are regarded as the engine that drives economic
growth.1 Success generally requires that early stage companies be fed
with sufficient infusions of capital often. It is therefore imperative that a
national policy of economic growth provide adequate capital-formation
opportunities for developing companies. The principal federal statute
regulating the offer and sale of securities is the Securities Act of 1933
(“1933 Act” or “Act”).2 The 1933 Act mandates a formal registration
process for all offers and sales of securities unless an exemption from
registration exists.3 Unfortunately, start-ups and developing companies
cannot, as a practical matter, raise capital under the expensive, timeconsuming process of registration.4 After having tapped out the
founders’ and their families’ resources, the only capital-raising
alternative for most companies not blessed with venture capital or angel

* Sam T. Dell Professor of Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. I would like
to acknowledge the excellent substantive and editing suggestions by Professor Marc I. Steinberg,
Darryl B. Deaktor, and by my research assistant Shara Scottland.
1. See Proclamation No. 9121, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,721 (May 9, 2014) (“Small businesses
represent an ideal at the heart of our Nation’s promise—that with ingenuity and hard work, anyone
can build a better life. They are also the lifeblood of our economy, employing half of our country’s
workforce and creating nearly two out of every three new American jobs.”); S EC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION: FINAL
REPORT 10 (2006) (“Small businesses pump billions into the economy. They are, in many ways,
what makes America great.”).
2. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012).
3. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a) (“Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security,
it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . to sell such security through the use or
medium of any prospectus or otherwise . . . .”). For a discussion of exemptions from the registration
mandate, see infra Part II.
4. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
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financing5 is to utilize registration exemptions that fit the company’s
condition and needs.
In light of the desire to foster small business growth, it might be
thought that registration exemptions would readily facilitate small
business capital financing. That is not the case. Every registration
exemption imposes substantial conditions upon a small company’s
ability to raise capital on an as-needed basis.6 A growing recognition of
the capital-formation problems has led to several statutory and
regulatory reforms in recent years.7 Those reforms, however, have not
touched one of the principal impediments to effective financing—
namely the so-called “integration doctrine,” a concept created by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) that
may thwart or invalidate efforts by companies to raise capital through
successive securities offerings.8 This agency-created doctrine is
both contrary and anachronistic to reform efforts to ease capitalformation capacities. The reform efforts to date will not bear fruit in the
manner intended unless the integration doctrine is eliminated or
significantly modified.
The integration doctrine, described more fully below,9 is raised
whenever a company engages in two or more securities offerings within
a relatively short time frame—something not at all uncommon among
capital-hungry young companies.10 The doctrine, which contains both
safe harbor time frames and an SEC-developed five-factor test,11
requires that when companies engage in successive offerings, those
offerings be examined as a whole to determine whether the separate
5. Venture capital companies and individual “angel” financiers provide substantial equity
financing to small and developing companies. DANIEL H. ARONSON, VENTURE CAPITAL: A
PRACTICAL GUIDEBOOK FOR BUSINESS OWNERS, MANAGERS AND ADVISORS 11-12 (5th ed. 2011).
Only a small fraction of all applicants for venture capital or angel financing are successful in their
applications. Id. at 15.
6. Conditions vary among exemptions. Among the more significant conditions are the
intrastate exemptions under section 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act and Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) Rule 147, which limit the location of offerees and purchasers and the scope of
the issuer’s business. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11); 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2014). Rule 504,
Rule 505, and Regulation A impose monetary ceilings on the amounts that can be raised. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.504(b)(2), .505(b)(2), .251(b). Rules 505 and 506(b) impose numerical limitations on the
number of investors who are not so-called “accredited investors,” and Rule 506(c) is limited to socalled “accredited investors.” Id. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), .506(b)–(c). For a fuller description of the
limitations and conditions imposed by the various exemptions, see generally Stuart R. Cohn &
Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing Failure to Address Small Business
Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1 (2007).
7. See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Parts III–IV.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part III.A.
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securities sales can functionally be deemed to be portions of a single
offering.12 If so, the deemed combined offering must meet a
single registration exemption, regardless of whether each of the distinct
parts was offered and sold in complete accordance with an
existing exemption.13
The integration doctrine can be illustrated as follows: A young
start-up company has tapped out the resources of its owners and friends
and needs to raise somewhere between $1 million and $1.5 million to
keep itself moving forward. A Rule 506(b) private offering arranged
through an investment adviser raises $400,000.14 Three months later, the
company advertises for accredited investors pursuant to the Rule 506(c)
exemption and raises $1 million.15 The investors in both offerings are
given complete information about the company, understand the risks of
their investments, and each of the transactions conform to their
respective registration exemption requirements, but for the issue of
integration. From an investor protection perspective, there should be no
policy basis to invalidate either of the offerings. Yet, the SEC, or one of
the purchasers who later regrets the investment, can charge that the two
offerings should be “integrated” as one, and that the deemed combined
offering violates the securities laws. If the charges are successful, which
is a likely prospect given the breadth of the integration doctrine,16 the

12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See infra Part III.A. The integration doctrine was described in an SEC release as follows:
The integration doctrine provides an analytical framework for determining whether
multiple securities transactions should be considered part of the same offering
[(integrated)]. This analysis helps to determine whether registration under Section 5 of
the Securities Act is required or an exemption [from registration] is available for the
entire offering. The integration doctrine, which has existed since 1933, prevents an issuer
from improperly avoiding registration by artificially dividing a single offering so that
Securities Act exemptions appear to apply to the individual parts where none would be
available for the whole.
Integration of Abandoned Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7943, 74 SEC Docket 571 (Jan. 26,
2001).
14. Rule 506(b) of Regulation D allows a company to raise an unlimited amount of funds,
provided that there are no more than thirty-five non-accredited investors who themselves, or
through a purchaser representative, have experience and knowledge in making investments in such
offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2014).
15. Rule 506(c) of Regulation D allows issuers to utilize general advertising and general
solicitation for purchasers as long as all purchasers are accredited investors. Id. § 230.506(c).
16. Given the relatively short time span between offerings and the fact that the money raised
in each offering was for working capital purposes, integration of the offerings under the SEC’s fivefactor test is likely. For a description of the five-factor test, see infra text accompanying note 63. If
combined, the deemed unitary offering will not satisfy Rule 506(b) because the latter offering was
publicly advertised (which is prohibited for a Rule 506(b) offering), and will not satisfy Rule 506(c)
because there were non-accredited investors in the earlier offering (which is prohibited in a Rule
506(c) offering). See id. § 230.506(b)–(c). Nor would any other exemption likely be available.
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result may be an SEC or judicial order requiring the company to return
all of the offering proceeds to the securities purchasers.17 What has been
gained other than the likely demise of a young company? The answer is
nothing, other than adherence to a formalistic doctrine that hampers the
capital-raising capacities of small businesses.
Integration would not be a serious problem if issuers could readily
fit successive offerings into a single exemption. Unfortunately,
registration exemptions are so loaded with technical requirements and
conditions that the integration doctrine, when applied, will almost
invariably result in the issuer being unable to satisfy any exemption for
the deemed unitary offering.18 An issuer that sold securities under one
exemption and is now faced with an unplanned integration problem is
highly unlikely to be able to bring a deemed combined offering under
the original or any other exemption.19 Thus, a company that needs to
raise capital more than once during a relatively short time period may
find either that: (1) it cannot do so under the integration doctrine; or (2)
alternatively, the company’s distinct offerings are deemed to be one
offering which, in the deemed combined form, violates the 1933 Act by
failing to meet the requirements of any registration exemption. Neither
of these results serves the goal of providing capital-formation
opportunities for small businesses. Moreover, the integration doctrine
fails to serve the fundamental goal of providing investor protection in
the capital-raising process.20 That basic goal, as well as the goal of
promoting capital formation, are now ingrained in the 1933 Act, which
Congress amended in 1996 to specifically state that the Commission, in
its rule-making process, must “consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.”21 If, as will be examined below, each registration
exemption contains substantive investor protection requirements,22 the
integration doctrine adds nothing to the achievement of any of the
express goals. The doctrine was wrong from its inception, serves no

17. See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2012). Section 12(a)(1) of the
1933 Act provides for rescission, plus interest, for all purchasers to whom the issuer is liable for
engaging in a violation of the registration requirement, or damages for those purchasers who no
longer own the security. Id.
18. See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 6, at 15-25.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 65-71.
20. For a discussion of the 1933 Act’s goal of investor protection, see infra text
accompanying notes 145-48.
21. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(b). Section 2(b) was added by the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3424.
22. For a discussion of investor protection elements within the various registration
exemptions, see infra Part IV.

2015]

KEEP SECURITIES REFORM MOVING

7

valid purpose, is a major hindrance to capital formation, and should be
eliminated except in the most limited circumstances.
Part II of this Article briefly describes the statutory and regulatory
registration exemptions provided by the 1933 Act that allow for capitalraising opportunities by smaller companies.23 Part III discusses the
historical development of the integration doctrine, its initial and later
justifications, and representative applications through no-action letters
and judicial decisions.24 Part IV critiques the arguments supporting the
doctrine and explores the doctrine’s inherent ambiguities and
inconsistencies.25 Part V examines the issue of investor protection with
respect to registration exemptions to determine whether the integration
doctrine is a necessary adjunct to this fundamental goal of the securities
laws.26 Part VI recommends that the integration doctrine be eliminated in
its entirety, except for a limited role with regard to the Rule 504 and
Rule 505 numerically based registration exemptions.27
II. CAPITAL RAISING BY SMALL- AND MEDIUM- SIZED COMPANIES
The 1933 Act, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first piece of New
Deal legislation, was a response to the enormous investment losses
incurred in the early years of the Great Depression.28 The 1933 Act
mandates a federal scheme of registration for securities offerings, but
exempts from such a mandate certain offerings that meet statutory
registration exemptions or any future agency-created registration
exemptions.29 The 1933 Act creates two statutory exemptions from
registration: (1) the so-called “intrastate exemption,” for when the issuer
and all offerees and purchasers of securities are residents within the
same state;30 and (2) the so-called “private offering exemption,” for

23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See infra Part VI.
28. LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 25 (2d ed. 1988) (“When the
Crash of 1929, followed by the Great Depression, finally led to the passage of the Securities Act of
1933 during the ‘hundred glorious days’ of President Roosevelt’s New Deal, the first problem was
determining what the role of the federal government should be in the protection of investors.”).
29. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012). Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act
authorizes the addition of other exemptions through administrative adoption. Securities Act of 1933
§ 3(b).
30. Id. § 3(a)(11) (exempting from registration “[a]ny security which is a part of an issue
offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such
security is a person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and
doing business within, such State or Territory”).
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transactions “not involving any public offering.”31 The Act provides that
these statutory exemptions could be augmented by regulatory
exemptions adopted where the agency administering the statute
determines that registration “is not necessary in the public interest and
for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or
the limited character of the public offering.”32
The term “public interest” was not defined in the 1933 Act. One
universally acknowledged element of public interest was, and remains,
the capacity of small companies to raise capital quickly and
inexpensively.33 Capital needs of smaller companies are often sporadic
and continual as a result of limited or non-existent revenue streams and
uncertain research and development expenses.34 Working capital is often
exhausted rapidly and must be continually supplemented as progress (or
lack thereof) demands.35 The registration process is, unfortunately,
extremely expensive, and time- and energy-consuming.36 Cost, timing,
and marketing factors create a far too heavy burden relative to the size
and capital needs of small- and medium-sized enterprises.37 The 1933
Act’s provisions for statutory and administrative registration exemptions
reflect the understanding that small and developing companies will
necessarily need to raise capital other than through registration.38
31. Id. § 4(a)(2). This provision was originally section 4(1) of the 1933 Act. It became section
4(2) as a result of certain amendments in 1964, and became section 4(a)(2) as a result of
amendments enacted under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (“JOBS Act”). See
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(b)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 314 (2012);
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 12, 78 Stat. 565, 580.
32. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(1). The ceiling for such regulatory exemptions, initially set
at $100,000, has been raised several times and is currently at $5 million. Id. The JOBS Act added
section 3(b)(2), authorizing the SEC to adopt rules exempting from registration certain offerings up
to $50 million annually. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 401(a)(2); see Securities Act of
1933 § 3(b)(2). Pursuant to such authority, the Commission adopted revised Regulation A
exemptions providing a Tier 1 exemption for offerings up to $20 million and a Tier 2 exemption for
offerings up to $50 million. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the
Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578,
Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,807 (Apr. 20, 2015).
33. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 1, at 8-9.
34. Cohn & Yadley, supra note 6, at 47.
35. The venture capital industry is well acquainted with this phenomenon and has devised
elaborate arrangements to account for multiple so-called “down-rounds” of additional investments.
36. See, e.g., PWC, CONSIDERING AN IPO? THE COSTS OF GOING AND BEING PUBLIC MAY
SURPRISE YOU 1 (2012) (“In addition to underwriter fees, on average companies incur $3.7 million
of costs directly attributable to their IPO.”). Companies that engage in a registered offering are
required to be public reporting companies for at least one year thereafter, regardless of their size or
number of shareholders. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)(1) (2012).
The periodic reporting requirements, which include annual audited financial statements, impose
considerable expense upon all reporting companies. PWC, supra at 13-14.
37. See PWC, supra note 36, at 13-14.
38. See, e.g., Manuel F. Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of
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Under its delegated authority, the SEC has created several
registration exemptions. The first was Regulation A—a kind of modified
registration that requires pre-offering submission of a disclosure
document to the SEC for its review and comment.39 Subsequently, under
pressure from the securities bar and the small business community, the
SEC adopted several additional registration exemptions: (1) the Rule
147 exemption for intrastate offerings;40 (2) the Rule 504 exemption for
offerings up to $1 million;41 (3) the Rule 505 exemption for offerings up
to $5 million;42 and (4) the Rule 506 exemption for private offerings of
unlimited amounts.43 Meanwhile, Congress also took note of the need
for additional registration exemptions, and in 1980, Congress added
section 4(5) to the 1933 Act—a self-executing statutory exemption
limited to so-called “accredited investors.”44
Despite the somewhat broad menu of registration exemptions, small
businesses and their advocates continued to press for reform due to the
difficult and technical requirements often imposed as conditions to the
various exemptions.45 As a result, there have been several reforms and
modifications to the exemptions. Among the reforms, the Commission

Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 119, 148-49 (1959) (“The [exemptions in the 1933 Act] reflect a
Congressional determination to temper the full effect of the statute as against offerings by small
business concerns . . . .”). Manuel Cohen served as Chair of the SEC from 1964 to 1969. SEC
Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
39. Regulation A consists of SEC Rules 251 through 263. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (2014).
In April 2015, Regulation A was amended to provide for two types of Regulation A offerings,
Tier 1 for offerings up to $20 million and Tier 2 for offerings up to $50 million. Amendments for
Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act
Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80
Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,807 (Apr. 20, 2015).
40. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147.
41. Id. § 230.504.
42. Id. § 230.505.
43. Id. § 230.506.
44. Section 4(5) was initially added as section 4(6) through the Small Business Investment
Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 602, 94 Stat. 2275, 2294. In 2010, Congress later
redesignated section 4(6) as section 4(5). Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 944(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1897-98 (2010). This statutory exemption has
proven to be of little importance because it is limited to $5 million and is not as flexible in terms of
amount to be raised or the nature of the purchasers as either Rule 505 or Rule 506. See Securities
Act of 1933 § 4(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(5) (2012); §§ 230.505–.506.
45. An annual conference between the SEC and representatives of small business interests is
mandated by section 503 of the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980. See Small
Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 § 503. The report of each conference contains reform
recommendations proposed by conference participants. The annual reports can be accessed on the
SEC’s website. U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, www.sec.gov/info/smallbusiness/
sbforumreps.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
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added a “substantial compliance” provision to Regulation D;46 revised
Regulation A to allow for preliminary “testing the waters” solicitations
of potential investors prior to filing an offering circular;47 and
eliminated, for Rule 504 offerings, both the prohibition against general
advertising and solicitation and the provision that securities sold are
restricted securities, provided that such offerings were state registered or
sold exclusively under state accredited investor exemptions.48
Legislative reforms in 1996 preempted state registration laws with
respect to so-called “covered securities,” which included offerings under
the Rule 506 private offering exemption.49 Most recently, the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (“JOBS Act”)50 took a threefold stab
at reform by: (1) creating a so-called “crowdfunding exemption”
intended to allow small companies to raise up to $1 million through
internet-based offerings;51 (2) mandating that the SEC revise its Rule
506 private offering exemption to allow general advertising and
solicitation in offerings limited to accredited investors;52 and (3)
directing the SEC to develop a new Regulation A-type exemption for
offerings up to $50 million.53
While the various reform measures have eased some of the
exemption limitations, the integration doctrine remains untouched and
applicable to every exempt offering, therefore continuing to be an

46. 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (expressing the result of “[i]nsignificant [d]eviations from a [t]erm,
[c]ondition or [r]equirement of Regulation D”).
47. Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949, Exchange Act Release No.
30,968, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2287, 51 SEC Docket 2154 (July 30, 1992).
48. Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the “Seed Capital” Exemption, Securities Act
Release No. 7644, 69 SEC Docket 364 (Feb. 25, 1999). Rule 502(c) of Regulation D prohibits
general advertising and general solicitation in connection with Regulation D offerings, and
Rule 502(d) provides that securities obtained in a Regulation D offering “cannot be resold without
registration under the Act or an exemption therefrom.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)–(d).
49. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. Law 104-290, § 102, 110
Stat. 3416, 3417-19.
50. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). The
JOBS Act consists of seven titles modifying existing securities law provisions or mandating the
SEC to undertake certain reform measures. Id. § 2.
51. Id. § 302.
52. Id. § 201(a)(1). Rule 506(c), allowing general advertising and solicitation in private
offerings where the sole purchasers are accredited investors, was adopted in 2013. Eliminating the
Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No. 69,959, Investment
Advisors Act Release No. 3624, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,774-76, 44,778 (July 24, 2013).
53. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 401(a)(2). Pursuant to Congress’s directive, the
SEC adopted revisions to Regulation A in 2015. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues
Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange
Act Release No. 74,578, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,807 (Apr.
20, 2015).
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obstacle to small business financing. The doctrine’s perseverance is not
due to the SEC’s ignorance of its effects. On the contrary, the
Commission has expressly acknowledged “the burdens that the
integration doctrine place on capital formation.”54 One can appreciate
the Commission’s concern that registration exemptions should not open
the door to securities offerings that may be misused contrary to
fundamental policy.55 However, the Commission’s intransigence on the
integration doctrine is difficult to understand given the doctrine’s lack of
clear statutory basis and adverse impact upon the efforts to improve the
capital-raising opportunities of small businesses. The recent critique by
SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, stating that “our focus should
be on aligning our exemptions with the ways in which companies raise
capital, rather than shoehorning capital-raising techniques into existing,
complicated exemptions,”56 and that “rarely do we remove any of our
rules, even after they have long since ceased to serve their purpose or
have become obsolete or worse,”57 is particularly apt to the continuing
problems created by the integration doctrine.
III.

THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

The integration doctrine is far easier to describe than to justify,
although description necessarily includes such vague terms as “single
plan of financing” and “same general purpose.”58 The doctrine has a
heavy bite. It has no good faith, substantial compliance, or advice of
counsel defenses. If applied, the doctrine’s result is inevitably a violation
of the 1933 Act’s section 12(a)(1) prohibition against improperly
offering or selling unregistered securities.59 The origin and purported
justification for this harsh result, therefore, need careful examination.
54. Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release No.
8828, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,922, 91 SEC Docket 685 (Aug. 3, 2007).
55. See James D. Cox, Who Can’t Raise Capital?: The Scylla and Charybdis of Capital
Formation, 102 KY. L.J. 849, 849 (2014) (“While the regulatory bodies share the common goal of
investor protection, the Securities and Exchange Commission also has among its stated objectives
the promotion of capital formation. Thus, it finds itself frequently faced with the conflicting tugs of
investor needs and calls for less friction on capital formation and the operation of the securities
markets.”).
56. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Whatever Happened to Promoting
Small Business Capital Formation? (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/
Speech/1370542976550.
57. Id.
58. For reference to these terms in the SEC’s five-factor test, see infra text accompanying
note 63.
59. For remedies provided under section 12(a)(1), see infra text accompanying note 70.
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A. Basic Elements and Application
Whenever a company engages in two or more securities offerings,
the integration doctrine requires that those offerings be analyzed to
determine whether they are in fact distinct or, on the contrary, can be
functionally deemed to be two parts of a single offering.60 If the multiple
offerings are deemed to be functionally one offering, that single offering,
in its combined form, must satisfy a registration exemption.61 Analysis is
based upon a five-factor integration test developed by the SEC.62 The
five-factor test asks whether the offers and sales effected in the
apparently distinct offerings:
(1) “are part of a single plan of financing;”
(2) “involve issuance of the same class of securities;”
(3) “have been made at or about the same time;”
(4) “involve the same type of consideration being received; and”
(5) “are made for the same general purpose.”63

Application of the five-factor test can be illustrated by the
following example: In January, an issuer engages in an intrastate
offering exempted under the statutory section 3(a)(11) intrastate offering
registration exemption.64 Five months later, in May, the issuer sells
shares to investors in a private offering that satisfies all the elements of
the statutory section 4(a)(2) registration exemption.65 Although each
offering satisfies its respective exemption requirements (but for
integration), the fact of successive offerings may cause the SEC or any
of the purchasers in either of the two offerings to raise the integration
doctrine. The January and May offerings would then be examined using
the five-factor test to determine whether they can functionally be
deemed to be related portions of a single offering. The SEC has never
indicated which of the five factors is the most prominent, but no-action
letters66 historically indicate that the principal inquiry would be whether
60. For the SEC’s description of the integration doctrine, see supra note 13.
61. See Darryl B. Deaktor, Integration of Securities Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 465, 492
(1979).
62. The five-factor test was initially set forth in an SEC Release. Section 3(a)(11) Exemption
for Local Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1961 WL 61651, at *1 (Dec. 6, 1961). It has
subsequently been repeated in Rule 147 and Rule 502 of Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.147,
.502(a) (2014).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a).
64. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012).
65. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2) (providing that the registration requirement of section 5
“shall not apply to . . . transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering”).
66. No-action letters are requests to SEC staff from issuers, usually from their counsel, to
consider whether, in the circumstances described in the issuer’s letter, the staff would agree that the
SEC should take “no action” if the offering went forward as proposed. No-Action Letters, U.S. SEC.
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the two offerings were “part of a single plan of financing.”67 If this
vague factor is deemed to exist, the two offerings will be regarded as
one, and that unitary offering must satisfy the conditions of a single
registration exemption. When the offerings are deemed combined, the
result may well be (and usually is) a failure to meet any registration
exemption. In this example, if a single investor in the May private
offering was not a resident of the issuer’s home state, the combined
offerings could not satisfy the section 3(a)(11) intrastate exemption.68
Likewise, if one or more of the purchasers in the January intrastate
offering did not qualify as a “sophisticated” investor for private offering
exemption purposes, the combined offering cannot satisfy the private
offering exemption.69 When combined, the offerings will not satisfy any
registration exemption, and therefore, both will be in violation of the
1933 Act, despite each of the two offerings’ individual compliance with
their respective exemption requirements. For purchasers in either
offering, section 12(a)(1) provides for rescission plus statutory interest,
or damages if the stock has already been resold at a loss.70 In an SEC
enforcement action, the issuer could be required to return all of the
offering proceeds to the investors.71 Sanctions and remedies are imposed
despite adherence by the company to the conditions of each of the two
offering exemptions. The integration doctrine has the curious effect, in
this instance and others, of inverting the maxim that “two wrongs don’t
make a right” into “two rights make a wrong.”
The integration doctrine can be peculiarly perverse when applied to
good faith securities sales by young companies. Suppose that founders
of a start-up sell some shares to a diverse group of college friends in
privately arranged transactions. It is possible, indeed likely, that one or
more of these several friends did not meet the “sophistication” standards
of the private offering exemption.72 The friends willingly undertook the
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm (last updated Sept. 21,
2012).
67. Deaktor, supra note 61, at 529 (“This component [(single plan of financing)] has emerged
in many administrative and judicial proceedings . . . as one of the most influential of the traditional
integration factors.”).
68. See Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11) (requiring all offerees and purchasers in a section
3(a)(11) offering to be residents of the same state).
69. See id. § 4(a)(2). All offerees and purchasers in a section 4(a)(2) offering must meet a
“sophistication” requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 152-58.
70. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a).
71. Id. § 8A(e) (authorizing the SEC to seek disgorgement from companies that have violated
the 1933 Act).
72. Both the section 4(a)(2) and Rule 506(b) private offering exemptions require a degree of
purchaser sophistication, although Rule 506(b) expressly permits otherwise unqualified purchasers
to utilize so-called “purchaser representatives” who do meet the qualifications. 17 C.F.R.
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risk and are not likely to care about compliance with exemption
technicalities even if their shares lose value. Several months later the
start-up needs a much larger infusion of capital and engages in a
carefully structured Rule 506(b) exempt offering. The purchasers this
time are sophisticated investors who look upon their investment in a
much more cold-hearted manner. If the company’s fortunes fail to meet
expectations, any one of the later investors could charge the company
with a violation of exemption conditions, based not on the Rule 506(b)
offering they participated in, but on an alleged integration of the prior
and subsequent offerings.73 The later Rule 506(b) offering will be
deemed invalid if combined with the earlier offering to friends who were
not qualified purchasers under Rule 506(b). The result would give a right
of rescission to all purchasers of the securities, which the later
purchasers may well assert if their investment has not met expectations.
Any such claims may be devastating to the company, which likely had
already spent the funds raised in the offerings and may have insufficient
capital to repay the purchasers. The result could be company insolvency,
as well as personal liability for the founders who helped sell the
securities.74 One must wonder about the justification for such a
potentially dark scenario when contrasted with the need to accommodate
the good faith capital-formation efforts by small businesses.
B. History and Justification
During the first year of the 1933 Act, a question arose of whether a
company that had filed a registration statement could sell a portion of the
proposed registered securities before the registration became effective by
utilizing the section 3(a)(11) intrastate registration exemption.75 Any
unsold securities would be offered throughout the country when the
registration became effective.76 At that time the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) handled securities questions, as the SEC was not
created until 1934.77 The FTC’s response to the proposed dual offering
process was negative, concluding without further explanation that selling

§ 230.506(b); see Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2); infra notes 156-70 and accompanying text.
73. The statute of limitation for claims based on registration violations is one year after the
violation occurred and in no event more than three years after the security was first offered to the
public. Securities Act of 1933 § 13.
74. See supra text accompanying note 70 for a discussion of section 12(a)(1) remedies.
75. See Securities Act Release No. 97, 1933 WL 28905, at *5 (Dec. 28, 1933).
76. See id.
77. The SEC was formed pursuant to section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012).
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“part of an issue” under the intrastate exemption and the remainder
under a registration statement would be in violation of the Act.78
The first adjudication to give content to the integration doctrine was
the SEC’s administrative ruling In the Matter of Unity Gold Corp.,79
involving a company that sold 75,000 of its shares in March 1937 to its
CEO under a then-existing registration exemption, while concurrently
filing a registration statement for the planned sale of 619,000 shares to
the public.80 The SEC charged, and then concluded, that the initial sale
to the CEO was “part of the same ‘issue’” as the shares covered by the
registration statement.81 The Commission found it “clear” that the sale to
the CEO and the registered offering “involved a single, integrated
plan.”82 When integrated with the planned registered offering, the
sale to the CEO came under no exemption and therefore violated the
1933 Act.83 Thus was born the integration doctrine. The SEC decision
did not address the question of why, as in why can an issuer not engage
in two or more offerings utilizing different elements of the 1933 Act and
its regulations. The response that such offerings are a “single, integrated
plan” begged the question as to why the issuer was precluded from
relying concurrently on multiple statutory and regulatory provisions.
Even assuming a “single, integrated plan” of stock distribution,
what statutory or policy justification exists that requires that coordinated
stock transactions be completed under a single statutory or
regulatory provision?
The SEC’s initial justification for the integration doctrine was set
forth in a 1961 SEC Interpretive Release (“1961 Release”) that based
application of the doctrine for intrastate offerings on the statutory phrase
“part of an issue” found in the section 3(a)(11) exemption.84 The 1961
Release noted that “[w]hether an offering is ‘part of an issue’ that is,
78. Securities Act Release No. 97, 1933 WL 28905, at *5. This was not a true integration
question; rather, it was a question of whether the identical securities that were being registered
could be simultaneously offered and sold under a registration exemption. Had the issuer wanted to
sell, for example, 100,000 shares in the registered offering and concurrently, or within a short time
frame, sell an additional 25,000 other shares in an intrastate offering, that would have posed a truer
integration question.
79. Securities Act Release No. 530, 1938 WL 34099 (July 19, 1938).
80. See id. at *3, *5.
81. Id. at *6.
82. Id. The two factors noted by the Commission as relevant in determining integration were:
(1) the methods of sale and distribution; and (2) the use of the proceeds. Id. The Commission’s
ruling concluded that “securities of the same class, offered on the same general terms to the public
in an uninterrupted program of distribution, cannot be segregated into separate ‘issues’ merely by
claiming an exemption for a limited portion of such shares.” Id.
83. See id.
84. Section 3(a)(11) Exemption for Local Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1961
WL 61651, at *1 (Dec. 6, 1961). See supra note 30 for the text of section 3(a)(11).
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whether it is an integrated part of an offering previously made or
proposed to be made, is a question of fact and depends essentially upon
whether the offerings are a related part of a plan or program.”85 The
semantic “part of an issue” reed was thin support for the integration
doctrine, particularly as the term is both ambiguous and not used in any
other registration exemption. Thus, a broader justification was needed.
Less than one year later, the SEC, describing integration in the context
of the section 4(2) private offering exemption, simply stated that the
question was whether a private offering “should be regarded as a part of
a larger offering made or to be made.”86 Determination would be based
on the five-factor test set forth in the 1961 Release.87
The Commission altered the integration doctrine in 1974 when it
created a time-based “safe harbor” for offerings under its newly adopted
Rule 147 intrastate exemption.88 The integration safe harbor was based
on the absence of other offerings during the six months preceding and
the six months following the Rule 147 offering.89 Integration would not
be applicable to issuers able to wait out the six months prior to and after
a current offering.90 For offerings less than six months apart, the fivefactor test would be applied to determine whether the offerings should
be treated as one.91 The six-month safe harbors were later extended to
the Rule 504, Rule 505, and Rule 506 registration exemptions contained
in Regulation D, which were adopted in 1982.92 At the same time, the
85. Section 3(a)(11) Exemption for Local Offerings, 1961 WL 61651, at *1.
86. Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1962 WL 69450, at *3
(Nov. 6, 1962).
87. See id.; supra text accompanying note 63.
88. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b) (2014); Notice of Adoption of Rule 147 Under the Securities
Act of 1933—“Part of an Issue,” “Person Resident,” and “Doing Business Within” for Purposes of
Section 3(a)(11) of that Act, Securities Act Release No. 5450, 3 SEC Docket 349 (Jan. 7, 1974).
89. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b)(2). The Rule provides as follows:
For purposes of this rule only, an issue shall be deemed not to include offers, offers to
sell, offers for sale or sales of securities of the issuer pursuant to the exemption provided
by section 3 or section 4(a)(2) of the Act or pursuant to a registration statement filed
under the Act, that take place prior to the six month period immediately preceding or
after the six month period immediately following any offers, offers for sale or sales
pursuant to this rule, Provided, That, there are during either of said six month periods no
offers, offers for sale or sales of securities by or for the issuer of the same or similar class
as those offered, offered for sale or sold pursuant to the rule.
Id.
90. See id. The six-month periods apply only to offerings outside of those time frames that are
made under section 3(b) or section 4(a)(2). See id.
91. For a description of the SEC’s five-factor test, see supra text accompanying note 63.
92. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). Rule 502(a) contains the safe harbors applicable to
Regulation D exemptions under Rules 504, 505, 506(b), and 506(c), and provides:
Offers and sales that are made more than six months before the start of a Regulation D
offering or are made more than six months after completion of a Regulation D offering
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Commission centered the justification for the integration doctrine on the
notion of circumvention, stating that “[t]he integration doctrine prevents
an issuer from circumventing the registration requirements . . . by
claiming a separate exemption for each part of a series of transactions
that constitute a single offering.”93
The SEC’s “circumvention” concern has become the predominant
justification for the integration doctrine, as reflected in a 2007 SEC
Release stating as follows: “While we recognize the burdens that the
integration doctrine places on capital formation, improper reliance on
exemptions from registration harms investors by depriving them of the
benefits of full and fair disclosure and the civil remedies that flow from
registration.”94 The integration doctrine is, thus, intended by the
Commission to preserve the primacy of registration as the principal
means of offering securities, thereby thwarting efforts by companies to
avoid registration by splitting offerings into segmented portions. The
SEC’s justification for the doctrine appears to stem from the following
line of reasoning: (a) the 1933 Act provides for registration as the
principal means of creating investor protection; (b) exemptions from
registration do not provide investor protection to the degree provided by
registration; and (c) therefore, issuers cannot be allowed to split a single
offering into distinct segments as a method to evade registration.95
will not be considered part of that Regulation D offering, so long as during those six
month periods there are no offers or sales of securities by or for the issuer that are of the
same or a similar class as those offered or sold under Regulation D, other than those
offers or sales of securities under an employee benefit plan as defined in Rule 405 under
the Act.
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a).
93. Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6455, 1983 WL 409415,
at *13-14 (Mar. 3, 1983). Prior to reaching this conclusion, the SEC provided in its interpretative
release that “[i]ntegration operates to identify the scope of a particular offering by considering the
relationship between multiple transactions. It is premised on the concept that the Securities Act
addresses discrete offerings and on the recognition that not every offering is in fact a discrete
transaction.” Id.
94. Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release No.
8828, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,922, 91 SEC Docket 685 (Aug. 3, 2007).
95. In its most recent comment on the integration doctrine, contained in the March 25, 2015,
Release adopting amendments to Regulation A, the Commission asserted that the integration safe
harbor provision in Regulation A “has historically provided . . . issuers, particularly smaller issuers
whose capital needs often change, with valuable certainty as to the contours of a given offering and
their eligibility for an exemption from Securities Act registration.” Amendments for Small and
Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No.
9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 Fed. Reg.
21,806, 21,818 (Apr. 20, 2015). It is quite probable that many small issuers would be willing to
sacrifice the SEC’s purported “valuable certainty” for a standard that allows greater flexibility in
raising capital. Indeed, it is appropriate to ask why “certainty” should be the normative doctrine for
what even the SEC recognizes as the changing capital needs of small companies. And if certainty is
an intended goal, much greater certainty would be achieved by eliminating the integration doctrine
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CRITIQUE OF THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE

The integration doctrine has had its share of severe critics, both as
to underlying policy and application. After exhaustively reviewing the
history of the doctrine and its application, Professor Darryl Deaktor
concluded that the SEC’s five-factor test “appears insufficiently focused
to provide guidance for the structuring of complex financial
arrangements,” and that the “generality of its language and the existence
of substantial overlaps in the factors engender confusion.”96 Professor
Rutherford Campbell was more blunt when he referred to the integration
doctrine as “one of the most vexing and pointless concepts of the
Securities Act of 1933.”97 American Bar Association (“ABA”)
committees have weighed in more than once attempting to modify the
doctrine,98 and even the SEC’s own advisory committee recommended a
substantial revision of the doctrine.99 Despite all, the Commission has
appeared oblivious to criticism. Given recent reform efforts, and the
continuing adverse impact of the integration doctrine on the capacity to
use registration exemptions, it is appropriate to revisit the doctrine to
examine its purported justification and the problems associated with its
definition and application.
A. The Circumvention Justification
The SEC’s principal justification for the integration doctrine centers
on the primacy of the registration process to protect investors and the
supposed lessening of such protection when companies engage in
rather than continuing its ambiguous standards.
96. Deaktor, supra note 61, at 541.
97. Rutherford B. Campbell, The Overwhelming Case for the Elimination of the Integration
Doctrine Under the Securities Act of 1933, 89 KY. L.J. 289, 289 (2000).
98. There have been two attempts by ABA committees to seek modification of the integration
provisions. Neither effort reached fruition. See A.B.A. Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec.,
Integration of Securities Offerings: Report of the Task Force on Integration, 41 BUS. LAW. 595,
623-24 (1986); A.B.A. Subcomm. on P’ships, Trusts and Unincorporated Ass’ns, Integration of
Partnership Offerings: A Proposal for Identifying a Discrete Offering, 37 BUS. LAW. 1591, 1610-12
(1982).
99. See Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release
No. 8828, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,922, 91 SEC Docket 685 (Aug. 3, 2007). The
attendant SEC release provided:
Our Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies advised that the six-month safe
harbor period from integration provided in Rule 502(a) “represents an unnecessary
restriction on companies that may very well be subject to changing financial
circumstances, and weighs too heavily in favor of investor protection at the expense of
capital formation” . . . . Based on their analysis of the issue, the Advisory Committee
recommended that we shorten the integration safe harbor from six months to 30 days.
Id.
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exempt offerings.100 The justification’s premise, however, may be
seriously doubted. While investor protection was unquestionably a major
goal of the 1933 Act, nothing in that act suggests that registration must
be preferred over exemptions in order to protect investors. The delegated
agency authority to create regulatory exemptions specifically allows for
exemptions where the registration requirement “is not necessary in the
public interest and for the protection of investors.”101 The implicit
premise is that registration exemptions will, through their own terms,
provide sufficient investor safeguards, even if such safeguards are not
equal to those provided by the registration process.102 Investor protection
in exempt transactions was also preserved in the 1933 Act through the
explicit application of the section 12(a)(2)103 and section 17104 antifraud
provisions to registration exemptions.105 The premise that registration
has primacy over exemptions because the former provides superior
investor protection is thus not justified by examining the 1933 Act’s
statutory provisions.
The “circumvention” justification as a protection against
registration evasion is also unconvincing. Granted that avoidance of
registration might be the motivation in a small number of cases that
involve split offerings, it is far more likely that such offerings are by
companies that have no thought of evading registration, but simply have
a legitimate need for immediate capital. Indeed, for nearly all small and
developing companies, registration is not a realistic option.106 Small
businesses do not have the time or resources to undertake a registered
offering. The notion that companies might engage in multiple offerings
in order to circumvent registration does not comport with reality, as such
companies cannot practically engage in a registered offering even if
multiple offerings were combined. To put it differently, if a company
needs to raise additional capital shortly after having engaged in an
exempt offering, its choices are not in fact registration or waiting
100. See supra text accompanying note 95.
101. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012).
102. Among the explicit investor protection elements in a registered offering are the mandated
disclosure documents reviewed by the Commission staff and the statutory liability provisions of
section 11 applicable to the issuer, directors, signors of the registration statement, underwriters, and
experts. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a).
103. Id. § 12(a)(2).
104. Id. § 17.
105. Id. § 12(a)(2) (“Any person who . . . offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by
the provisions of section 3[)] . . . by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes
an untrue statement of a material fact . . . .”); id. § 17 (“The exemptions provided in section 3 shall
not apply to the provisions of this section.”).
106. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of costs of a registered
offering.
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multiple months before starting another offering. The goal is not to break
the law, but to raise capital, which realistically can only be accomplished
through a registration exemption. Thus, rather than deeming multiple
offerings as a means to evade registration—a pejorative conclusion that
implies bad motives—it is more appropriate to regard the multiple
offerings as a company’s effort to maximize its capital-formation
opportunities within the parameters of exemption conditions. In
reviewing the Commission’s “evasion” concern, one commentator
appropriately noted that the purported justification fails to distinguish
good faith capital-raising efforts (which are likely to be much more
numerous) from those that are perhaps more suspect.107 Although this
analysis is correct, the commentator’s recommendation that the
integration doctrine be revised to focus on whether the company had a
legitimate business reason for needing the additional capital108 carries
the unfortunate burden of ambiguity. A legitimate business reason might
exist for allowing multiple offerings where unanticipated financial needs
arise, but even in such circumstances, one can imagine the SEC or civil
litigants arguing as to what is truly unanticipated, with the burden of
proof being placed on the issuer to justify the timing, needs, and
amounts of its various offerings.
The most serious flaw in the Commission’s justification for the
integration doctrine is the notion that the doctrine is a necessary adjunct
to the goal of investor protection.109 The underlying presumption is that
registration exemptions do not provide adequate investor protection to
potential purchasers. In fact, investor protection elements are contained
in the various registration exemptions, as discussed below.110 It defies
logic to conclude that the investor protection elements contained in the
various exemptions are vitiated in an offering that fully complies with all
exemption conditions when the issuer subsequently sells additional
securities under another exemption that also fully complies with the
exemption conditions for that offering. Suffice it to say that, at this
point, the presumption of inadequate protection is a faulty one and belies
the Commission’s own efforts to create investor safeguards within each
of the various exemptions.

107. Cheryl L. Wade, The Integration of Securities Offerings: A Proposed Formula That
Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 199, 228-29 (1994).
108. Id. at 238.
109. See supra text accompanying note 95.
110. See infra Part V.
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B. Inherent Ambiguities and Inconsistencies
1. The Five-Factor Test
There are no bright-line tests to determine answers to any
integration question under the SEC’s five-factor test. Nor has the
Commission provided guidance as to the meaning or relative weights of
the various factors.111 The ambiguities and uncertainties inherent in the
test have been so thoroughly criticized that additional critique is
superfluous.112 The ambiguities of the five elements essentially come
down to an “eye of the beholder” determination. If a company raises
$200,000 in March and the growth of the company requires raising an
additional $300,000 in July, is that part of a “single plan of financing”?
Even if the company had a business plan that called for raising $200,000
in March and then, depending on the progress of the company, raising an
additional $300,000 several months later if needed, is that contingency
planning a “single plan of financing”? If a small start-up raises $700,000
to finance equipment and four months later raises $500,000 to open a
marketing office, does the fact that the entire $1,200,000 is employed to
get the business off the ground mean that the offerings are for the “same
general purpose”? There are no bright-line standards to answer these
questions, yet the standards impose themselves upon every company that
raises capital through more than a single offering. Those companies and
their counsel may well agree with the conclusion by one commentator
that the five-factor test has launched “more than [forty] years of
ambiguity, confusion and contradiction.”113
If issuers and their counsel are unable to determine whether discrete
offerings will be combined under the integration doctrine, it is little
comfort to advise a company that it can request a no-action letter from
111. Theodore W. Jones, The Doctrine of Securities Act “Integration,” 29 SEC. REG. L.J. 320,
325 n.24 (2001) (“Unfortunately, the Commission has never indicated which factors carry the most
weight or just how many of these factors must be analyzed to suggest the absence of a relationship
between offerings in order for an issuer to avoid integration. As such, any analysis under the five
factors test involves inherent uncertainty.”).
112. See, e.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 237 (6th ed. 2009)
(“The Commission has not provided any significant guidance as to how these [five factors] should
be weighted . . . . The . . . guidelines . . . do not provide much certainty in planning exemptions.”);
LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 360 (4th ed. 2004)
(stating that the “multifactor test may fairly be criticized as . . . indeterminate”); Perry E. Wallace,
Jr., Integration of Securities Offerings: Obstacles to Capital Formation Remain for Small
Businesses, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 935, 989 (1988) (“The integration doctrine continues to
frustrate issuers engaged in the capital formation process, engulfing them in a sea of ambiguity,
uncertainty, and potential liability.”).
113. Jerald Cliff McKinney, II, Factoring the Ambiguity: A Futile Attempt to Understand the
Ambiguous Nature of the Integration Doctrine’s Five-Factor Test, 31 SEC. REG. L.J. 337, 337
(2003).
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SEC staff.114 For one, that is asking the company to go into the mouth of
the tiger that invented, and is committed to, the doctrine. If the question
boils down to the “single plan of financing” factor, which is often the
most prevalent question, there is a dearth of practical guidance and the
SEC’s application of this factor through no-action letter requests has, at
best, “lacked consistency.”115 Moreover, SEC staff does not necessarily
view capital-raising efforts in the same business-oriented light as issuers.
Thus, for example, an issuer that distinguished an initial offering as
“seed capital” from an offering two months later that it regarded as
“long-term financing” was denied no-action relief.116 Another issuer who
had a common stock offering followed by a convertible debenture
offering was likewise denied a no-action letter because the debentures
were convertible into common stock, and the SEC staff conflated the
two securities regardless of their differing financial elements or the
timing or likelihood of any eventual conversion.117 Even if an issuer
receives a favorable no-action letter, there is the ever-present risk that
the letter cannot be relied upon if there are any deviations from the
described offering process—a precarious condition given the exigencies
of particular financing needs and investor demands.118
Recent Commission statements have been equally obtuse in
defining the parameters of the integration doctrine. In its March 2015
Release adopting revised Regulation A, the Commission stated: “[W]e
believe that an offering made in reliance on Regulation A should not be
integrated with another exempt offering made by the issuer, provided
that each offering complies with the requirements of the exemption that
is being relied upon for the particular offering.”119 At first glance, this
statement looks like an acceptance of the sensible notion that
114. See supra note 66. A no-action request details the issuer’s proposed offering and sets forth
the issuer’s basis for concluding that the proposed conduct is permissible within a particular
exemption or other statutory or regulatory requirement. No-Action Letters, supra note 66.
115. Deaktor, supra note 61, at 529; see also Daniel J. Morrisey, Integration of Securities
Offerings—The ABA’s “Indiscreet” Proposal, SEC. L. REV., 1985, at 165 (“The letters are often
difficult to harmonize even when they deal with analogous situations.”).
116. LaserFax, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 78,136 (Sept. 16, 1985).
117. State St. Mortg. Co., SEC No-Action Letter [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 78,415 (Mar. 12, 1987); see also LaserFax, Inc. [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,136.
118. It should also be noted that no-action letters are staff opinions, not binding on the
Commission. See No-Action Letters, supra note 66. Although an SEC enforcement action would be
highly unlikely after a no-action letter has been granted, any slight deviation from the terms of the
proposed offering could result in the negation of the staff opinion. See id.
119. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578, Trust
Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,819 (Apr. 20, 2015).
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independent exemptions will not be integrated, provided that each meets
its own exemption terms. That does not appear to be the case. The
statement is qualified by two examples of exempt offerings made
concurrently with a Regulation A offering, with both examples being
highly unlikely to occur.120 Moreover, the examples referencing
“concurrent” offerings are problematic. When are two offerings in fact
“concurrent” for integration purposes? The Regulation A integration
provisions clearly apply the integration doctrine for most exempt
offerings made within six months following a Regulation A offering.121
If the non-Regulation A offering ends prior to the Regulation A offering,
Regulation A already provides for no integration of those offerings.122 If
the non-Regulation A offering ends subsequent to the Regulation A
offering, the five-factor integration test will apply to offers and sales
after the Regulation A offering ended.123 The Commission’s statement
affirming the validity of independent exempt offerings does not add any
new element to the integration equation. Given the risks and ambiguities
inherent in the integration doctrine, it will be the rare counsel or
company that advises or chooses to undertake an otherwise exempt
offering concurrent with Regulation A.
Courts seem a bit more understanding of, and responsive to, the
plight of small businesses, although little practical guidance can be
gleaned from the relatively few reported cases.124 Courts have denied
plaintiff summary judgment motions on the grounds that the ambiguities
120. See id. One example is an offering for which general solicitation is not permitted, such as
a Rule 506(b) offering, being made concurrently with a Regulation A offering that has “tested the
waters” through general solicitation of potential investors. Id. The second example is an offering
that allows general solicitation, such as Rule 506(c), in which the offering also advertises the
concurrent Regulation A offering. Id. The first example would fail the integration test if any of the
Rule 506(b) offerees were solicited through the Regulation A “testing the waters” process. The
second example would fail the integration test, per the SEC, if the Rule 506(c) materials did not
provide sufficient Regulation A disclosures. Both examples are unusual insofar as it would be
highly unlikely for a company to be raising money through concurrent Regulation A and private
offerings, especially given the increased ceilings of $20 million (Tier 1) and $50 million (Tier 2) for
Regulation A offerings and the marketing advantages of Regulation A offerings relative to private
offerings. Id. at 21,807.
121. SEC Rule 251(c)(2) has an exclusive list of post-Regulation A offerings that are not
subject to the integration test. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(2) (2014). The only exempt offerings
within that list are stock sales made pursuant to employee benefit plans, foreign transactions under
Regulation S, and sales under the crowdfunding exemption of section 4(a)(6). Id. The exemption for
sales under the crowdfunding exemption is a recent addition to Rule 251(c)(2). 80 Fed. Reg. at
21,895.
122. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(1).
123. 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,895.
124. See, e.g., ABA Subcomm. on P’ships, Trusts and Unincorporated Ass’ns, supra note 98,
at 1597 (“[V]ery few cases have provided an analysis that is instructive to counsel involved in
securities offerings that present such issues.”).
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within the integration doctrine required more extensive findings of
fact.125 In a case in which the issuer had engaged in six offerings within
a two-and-a-half-year period, the District Court of Massachusetts
expressed a clear sympathy for the issuer’s plight in not being able to
obtain adequate financing and that “each successive financing was
expected by the defendants to be the last.”126 The Southern District of
New York court expressed a similar recognition of the financing
problems facing small companies when it denied application of the
integration doctrine where “unforeseen operating difficulties” required
the issuer to undertake multiple offerings.127
SEC enforcement actions and cases that have applied the
integration doctrine are not numerous, yet the relative paucity of such
actions does not render the doctrine benign for lack of force. There are
cogent reasons for the lack of reported cases. Investors who might have
integration-based claims may be satisfied with their economic return
and, thus, would not desire to pursue a rescission remedy. For those
investors who do make claims, the matters might be privately settled
through buyouts or other economic arrangements. Despite the lack of
reported violations, the integration doctrine’s bite is ever-present and
significant. Companies aware of the doctrine or represented by counsel
astute in securities laws may receive negative, or at best cautionary,

125. See, e.g., SEC v. Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc., No. 10-CV-00621, 2013 WL 1000329,
at *4 (D. Ida. Mar. 13, 2013); In re Veritas Fin. Corp., No. 05-10774, 2007 WL 2293009, at *1, *5
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2007).
126. Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104, 1106-07 (D. Mass. 1974). The
district court in Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., stated:
In the instant case, some basis for integration appears in the facts that (a) for the most
part the offerings were made for the same general purpose, and (b) the parties recognized
that the first financing in October, 1967 might be inadequate and additional financing
might be required. On the other hand, everyone hoped and expected that the initial
$630,000 would be sufficient to enable LPC [(a now bankrupt company for which the
defendants sold unregistered securities)] to operate profitably. It was felt that deposits by
tourists reserving places on package tours sponsored by LPC, known as the “customer
deposit float,” would supplement its working capital sufficiently to enable it to prosper.
Thereafter, each successive financing was expected by the defendants to be the last
which would be required to make LPC self-supporting. A series of obstacles to
profitability was encountered, many of them beyond the control of the company or the
defendants who, incidentally, each invested $1,400,000 of their own funds. Specific
acquisitions of subsidiaries and the charter of a cruise ship, MTS Orpheus, were not
contemplated at the time of the first financing in October, 1967. The evidence simply did
not show a single plan of financing. Moreover, the several offerings were not made at or
about the same time, different classes of securities were issued and the prices of the
securities varied. On balance, the integrated offering doctrine is clearly inapplicable.
Id. at 1107.
127. Barrett v. Triangle Mining Corp., No. 72-CV-5111, 1976 WL 760, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2,
1976).
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advice as to whether planned offerings may go forward. Indecision could
result in not moving forward with needed financing or, perhaps, altering
plans in order to attempt to avoid integration’s application, such as
offering a different class of securities than what was optimally
considered.128 Lurking behind the integration doctrine is not only the
potentiality of rescission actions against the company, but also personal
liability of the company officers who participated in the offering
process.129 Other less obvious problems could exist. Companies that
undertake registered or Regulation A offerings are required to disclose
prior offerings to the SEC.130 The Commission may take a hard, and
potentially unhappy, look at the company’s history, as occurred in the
Unity Gold case,131 and determine that prior securities offerings were
invalid on account of the integration doctrine.132 Quite apart from the
doctrine’s effect upon additional securities offerings, companies with
integration problems based on past offerings may need to disclose
contingent liabilities in their financial statements given to lenders or
other third parties.
2. The Six-Month Safe Harbors
The six-month safe harbors applicable to Rule 147, Regulation A,
and Regulation D exemptions133 have the virtue of creating a clear
cut-off for the integration doctrine. However, the safe harbors are not a
panacea, especially for small and developing companies. Six months is
an arbitrary time frame that, for many smaller companies, may be too
long a period to wait before safely raising additional capital. In 2006, the
SEC’s own advisory committee recognized this problem when it
recommended reducing the safe harbors to thirty days, a
128. See, e.g., Deaktor, supra note 61, at 473-74 (“[A]n issuer uncertain of the applicability of
integration to a proposed offering may be forced to forego the proposed offering altogether or to
adjust its characteristics significantly to avoid a potential violation of the registration requirements.
Either course of action may entail considerable hardship for the issuer.”).
129. Defendants in section 12(a)(1) actions may include individuals who solicited purchasers
on behalf of the issuer. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 629-30 (1988) (remanding the case to
lower courts to determine whether purchaser of securities in private offering who solicited others to
purchase was soliciting on behalf of the issuer rather than giving gratuitous advice).
130. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.701, 239.90 (2014). Item 701 of Regulation S-K, which sets forth
disclosure requirements for registered offerings, requires issuers to detail all unregistered sales of
securities in the prior three years. 17 C.F.R. § 229.701. Item 6 of Part I of Form 1-A used in a
Regulation A offering requires disclosure of all unregistered securities issued or sold during the
prior year. 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (2014).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
132. Unity Gold Corporation, Securities Act Release No. 530, 1938 WL 34099, at *6 (July 19,
1938).
133. For a description of the integration doctrine’s six-month safe harbors, see supra text
accompanying notes 88-93.
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recommendation that would have effectively eliminated the integration
doctrine.134 While regarding thirty days as too short a time frame, the
Commission was sensitive to the fact that six months may be too long a
period in some circumstances and, therefore, in response to the Advisory
Committee, proposed reducing the integration safe harbor period to
ninety days.135 Inexplicably, and without comment, this proposal was
never adopted. The six-month periods remain, although equally
inexplicably, the safe harbors do not apply to all exemptions. The
intrastate section 3(a)(11) statutory exemption and the private offering
section 4(a)(2) statutory exemption do not benefit from the regulatory
safe harbors. Offerings under those statutory exemptions continue to be
saddled with timing and criteria uncertainties. Indeed, strict
interpretation of the regulatory safe harbors could lead to the rather
absurd result that a section 4(a)(2) offering in January might be
integrated with a Rule 506 offering in September, but the Rule 506
offering would have the protection against integration afforded by its
six-month safe harbor.136
134. FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES
THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 94-96 (2006),
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsps/acspc-finalreport.pdf.
135. Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release No.
8828, 91 SEC Docket 685 (Aug. 3, 2007). The Commission’s report noted:
The current six-month time frame of the safe harbor in Rule 502(a) provides a
substantial time period that has worked well to clearly differentiate two similar offerings
and provide time for the market to assimilate the effects of the prior offering. The
Advisory Committee has expressed concern, however, that such a long delay could
inhibit companies, particularly smaller companies, from meeting their capital needs. We
recognize that increased volatility in the capital markets and advances in information
technology have changed the landscape of private offerings. We remain concerned,
however, that an inappropriately short time frame could allow issuers to undertake serial
Rule 506-exempt offerings each month to up to 35 non-accredited investors in reliance
on the safe harbor, resulting in unregistered sales to hundreds of non-accredited investors
in a year. Such sales could result in large numbers of non-accredited investors failing to
receive the protections of Securities Act registration. Our proposal seeks to strike an
appropriate balance between the number of non-accredited investors allowed in an
offering relying on the integration safe harbor and the non-public nature of that offering.
It would be an anomalous result that an issuer could make an offering to hundreds of
non-accredited investors in reliance on the integration safe harbor, triggering reporting
requirements under the Exchange Act, without a public offering. We propose, therefore,
to lower the safe harbor time frame to 90 days rather than the 30 days recommended by
the Advisory Committee. We believe 90 days is appropriate, as it would permit an issuer
to rely on the safe harbor once every fiscal quarter.
Id.
136. This rather odd result is due to the apparent “one-way” integration provision of Rule
502(a) of Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2014) (“Offers and sales that are made more than
six months before the start of a Regulation D offering or are made more than six months after
completion of a Regulation D offering will not be considered part of that Regulation D
offering . . . .”). Among other inconsistencies in the integration doctrine is the broader “two-way”
TO
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Variations among time frames are not the only inconsistencies
within the integration doctrine. If the SEC is concerned about
circumvention of registration requirements, why did it eliminate
integration with regard to any offering that precedes a Regulation A
offering regardless of timing or amount?137 And having eliminated the
integration doctrine for offerings that precede a Regulation A offering,
why did the SEC impose the doctrine upon post-Regulation A
offerings?138 Why does integration specifically apply to Rule 504
offerings up to $1 million, yet the SEC has eliminated integration for the
so-called “crowdfunding exemption,” which also exempts up to $1
million of capital raised?139 If companies engage in “bridge financing” to
raise capital prior to a forthcoming registered initial public offering
(“IPO”),140 why does SEC Rule 152 eliminate integration for
section 4(a)(2) and Rule 506 private offerings that precede a registered
offering but retain the integration doctrine for bridge financing effected
under Rule 504, Rule 505, or the intrastate registration exemptions?141
Similarly, why does Rule 155 create an integration safe harbor (and after
only thirty days, not six months) for withdrawn registration statements
followed by private offerings but not for any other exempt offerings
following a withdrawn registration?142
Inconsistencies within the integration doctrine are inexplicable and
lead to illogical results and mistakes in planning securities offerings.
provision in Rule 251(c) of Regulation A. Id. § 230.251(c).
137. Id. § 230.251(c)(1).
138. Rule 251(c)(2) contains a limited list of post-Regulation A offerings that are not subject to
integration with the Regulation A and includes a six-month safe harbor similar to Regulation D. Id.
§ 230.251(c)(2).
139. See Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9974, Exchange Act Release No. 76,324,
80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,499 (Nov. 16, 2015) (adopting an amendment specifying no integration in
crowdfunding exemptions with any other securities offering).
140. “Bridge financing” refers to the period just prior to a public offering during which the
company needs capital to finance the interim period and the public offering expenses. Bridge
Financing, BUSINESSFINANCE.COM (June 19, 2007), http://www.businessfinance.com/articles/
bridge-financing.htm.
141. 17 C.F.R. § 230.152. In a similar vein, Rule 255(e) of Regulation A, which applies to a
Regulation A offering that is abandoned in favor of a registered offering, creates an integration
distinction depending on whether during the Regulation A offering the issuer had solicited only
qualified institutional buyers and accredited investors, or whether there had been solicitation of the
lesser masses. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578, Trust
Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,899 (Apr. 20, 2015). In the latter case, the
issuer must wait at least thirty calendar days between the last solicitation and the filing of the
registration statement. Id. There is no compelling evidence that such a thirty-day waiting period
provides needed investor protection given the technical requirements and intended safeguards of a
registered offering.
142. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.155.
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Companies might learn too late that the integration impediment could
have been avoided by use of a different exemption in earlier offerings.
For example, suppose a company raised $4 million in a Regulation A
offering and three months later needs an additional $2 million for current
operational expenses. The integration doctrine is likely to invalidate any
short-term subsequent offering as well as the initial Regulation A
offering.143 However, had the company’s initial offering of $4 million
been made under Rule 505 or Rule 506 of Regulation D, a later
Regulation A offering would not be integrated with the earlier offering,
and the financing could be achieved without integration risk.144 Reason
defies logic for such a result.
V.

IS THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE NECESSARY FOR
INVESTOR PROTECTION?

Investor protection is the undisputed primary goal of securities
laws.145 That is what motivated the enactment of the 1933 Act following
the enormous investor losses incurred prior to and during the Great
Depression.146 Investor protection was sought to be achieved through a
variety of means, including agency review of registration statements
prior to any public offering, specific standards for disclosure in
registration statements, agency rulemaking authority, the continued
application of state securities laws,147 and specific provisions for civil,
administrative, and criminal sanctions applicable to registered and
exempt offerings in the event of disclosure violations.148
143. Regulation A will be subject to integration under the five-factor test for any subsequent
offers within six months except registered offerings and foreign offerings under Regulation S. Id.
§ 230.251(c)(2). The only exception would be a Regulation S offering directed solely to foreign
purchasers outside the United States. Regulation S offerings do not integrate with any registration
exemptions. Id. § 230.251(c)(2)(iv).
144. Regulation A offerings are not integrated with any prior offerings. Id. § 230.251(c)(1)
(“Offers and sales made in reliance on this Regulation A will not be integrated with: (1) prior offers
or sales of securities . . . .”).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
146. See supra text accompanying note 28.
147. Section 18 of the 1933 Act specifically preserved state authority to regulate securities
offerings made within the state. Securities Act of 1933 § 18(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (2012).
Since 1933, there has been some limited preemption of state registration provisions for certain types
of offerings, but state antifraud provisions continue to apply to all offers and sales regardless of
federal registration or federal exemption from registration. See, e.g., Small Business and the SEC,
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm (last visited
Nov. 22, 2014).
148. The 1933 Act antifraud provisions applicable to exempt offerings are section 12(a)(2) and
section 17. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. Investors also have available
Rule 10b-5 remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), as well as state law
remedies. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R.
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The drafters of the 1933 Act recognized that the registration process
is not necessary for some types of securities offerings.149 The 1933 Act
thus sought to strike a balance between offerings for which an agencyreviewed registration was necessary and offerings for which the public
interest did not require registration. Nowhere among any of the
exemptions listed in sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act, or the
authorization for additional rule-based exemptions, was there any
suggestion that issuers could not utilize multiple registration exemptions
concurrently or within a relatively short time span. The natural question
to ask, therefore, is whether the SEC’s integration doctrine is a necessary
or appropriate factor for the protection of investors. Given the
Commission’s own acknowledgement that its integration doctrine
imposes a burden on the ability of companies to take advantage of
registration exemptions,150 the integration doctrine can only be justified
if it provides a necessary element of investor protection. The doctrine’s
continued existence must be seriously questioned if it is extraneous to
the principal purpose of the 1933 Act while imposing an unquestioned
burden upon small business financing.
From the perspective of investor protection, the SEC’s
“circumvention” justification fails to account for the fact that each
registration exemption carries its own distinct set of conditions intended
to foster both capital formation and investor protection. Each time an
issuer utilizes a registration exemption, it is done in accordance with
existing statutory, regulatory, and judicially imposed substantive
conditions. Issuers’ reliance upon specific exemption conditions raises
an interesting question, as section 19(a) of the 1933 Act contains a
curious “good faith” provision stating:
No provision of this title imposing any liability shall apply to any act
done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule or regulation
of the Commission, notwithstanding that such rule or regulation may,
after such act or omission, be amended or rescinded or be determined
by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason. 151

Given the ambiguities inherent in the integration doctrine, it may be
plausible to consider whether this statutory provision exculpates issuers
who engage in multiple offerings in good faith believing that they are
not violating the integration elements.
§ 240.10b-5 (2014).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32 discussing statutory registration exemptions
and the delegation of administrative authority to create additional registration exemptions.
150. See supra text accompanying note 94.
151. Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a).
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It is safe to presume, indeed unfathomable to conclude otherwise,
that the terms of each exemption were thoroughly vetted by the SEC
relative to the goal of investor protection. The SEC’s pejorative
“circumvention” characterization of an issuer’s decision to engage in
two or more offerings ignores the fact that the issuer has acted entirely
within the exemption provisions containing specific conditions intended
to protect potential investors. Examination of the principal registration
exemptions reflects these investor protection elements.
A. The Private Offering Exemptions
Section 4(a)(2) simply, and without definition, exempts
“transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.”152 It did
not take long for the SEC to give content to this enigmatic statutory
phrase. A 1935 Interpretive Release focused on the number of offerees
and their relationship to the issuer, the number of units offered, the size
of the offering and the manner of offering.153 The exemption was given
further, and significant, substantive content in the Supreme Court’s 1953
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.154 decision that emphasized the personal
qualifications of, and degree of, disclosure to potential investors.155 The
Court held that in determining the conditions for a registration
exemption, “inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the
protections afforded by registration.”156 The issue for the Court was
whether the offerees could “fend for themselves” without a registration
process.157 Focus was therefore upon the capacity of the potential
purchaser to understand the risks and merits of the offering, including
whether the potential investor had access to sufficient information to
make an informed decision.158
Investor protection elements are equally evident in Rule 506—the
SEC-created regulatory private offering exemption. Prior to the mandate
of the JOBS Act, there was only one Rule 506 exemption.159 Today there
152. Id. § 4(a)(2). This exemption was initially section 4(1) of the 1933 Act, later became
section 4(2), and as a result of the JOBS Act, is now set forth in section 4(a)(2). See supra note 31.
153. Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Factors to be Considered in Determining the
Availability of the Exemption From Registration Provided by the Second Clause of Section 4(1),
Securities Act Release No. 285, 1935 WL 27785 (Jan. 24, 1935).
154. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
155. Id. at 124-25.
156. Id. at 127.
157. Id. at 125.
158. Id. at 127 (“The employees here were not shown to have access to the kind of information
which registration would disclose.”).
159. The JOBS Act mandated that the SEC develop an alternative Rule 506 exemption that
allowed general advertising and solicitation if all of the purchasers are accredited investors.
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are two: Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c). The initial Rule 506 explicitly
adopted the Ralston Purina requirement that investors be able to fend for
themselves. As reflected in Rule 506(b), each purchaser must have “such
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment.”160 Excluded from this so-called “sophistication
requirement” is a set of purchasers defined as “accredited investors,”
who are presumed by reason of their financial capacities or particular
relationship to the issuer to possess the requisite knowledge and
experience to be qualified purchasers.161 In addition to the personal
qualification provisions: non-accredited investors, of which the issuer
must reasonably believe that there are no more than thirty-five,162 are
required to receive specific disclosures described in Rule 502(b);163
securities purchased in any Rule 506 offering are deemed “restricted,”
meaning that they cannot be readily resold except under prescribed
conditions;164 and all purchasers are entitled to the protections of antifraud provisions.165 Moreover, Rule 506(d) prohibits the use of the
exemption if the issuer, its predecessors and affiliated issuers, or any of
its directors, certain officers, promoters, twenty percent beneficial
owners, or specified other persons, are subject to a “disqualifying

Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012).
160. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2014). It is sufficient if the issuer has a reasonable belief
that the purchaser possesses such qualifications. See id. A potential investor lacking such
qualifications might nevertheless become a purchaser if he or she, together with his or her purchaser
representative, possesses such qualifications. See id.
161. Id. § 230.501(a). The accredited investor concept was initially created for the statutory
section 4(5) exemption created in 1980 for offerings limited to accredited investors. A definition of
accredited investors was added as section 2(a)(15) of the 1933 Act. Securities Act of 1933
§ 2(a)(15), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (2012); Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-477, § 603, 94 Stat. 2275, 2294. The SEC then incorporated the statutory definition of
accredited investor into Regulation D on the basis that “certain purchasers would be presumed to
meet the purchase qualifications, thereby eliminating the need for subjective judgments by the
issuer about the suitability of such investors.” Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the
Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and
Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6339, 23 SEC Docket 446 (Aug. 7, 1981).
162. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i).
163. Id. § 230.502(b). The extent of the disclosure varies depending on the total amount of the
issuer’s offering and whether the issuer is a 1934 Act reporting company. See id.
164. Id. § 230.502(d). Rule 144 imposes minimum holding periods for restricted securities to
assure, in part, that such securities are not quickly transferred into the hands of persons who may not
have been qualified initial purchasers. Id. § 230.144(d).
165. The principal enforcement actions in the event of a material disclosure problem would be
an SEC action under section 17 of the 1933 Act and either administrative or private actions under
Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act. See Securities Act of 1933 § 17; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). Issuers
are also subject to potential criminal prosecutions under both the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, as well as
state law statutory and common law sanctions.
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event.”166 These events are defined to include criminal convictions in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security and other specified
crimes, certain court injunctions, SEC and other specified agency orders,
and other enumerated events.167
The substantial investor protection measures within the statutory
and regulatory private offering exemptions leave neither room nor need
for an integration requirement. The integration doctrine does not fill any
gap in investor protection elements. The doctrine simply melds two or
more offerings into one. But for what substantive end if each of the
offerings has satisfied all investor protection conditions imposed by the
particular exemptions?
B. The Regulation A Exemption
From an investor protection perspective, the integration doctrine
fares no better when considering the Regulation A exemption.
Regulation A requirements include issuer eligibility, disclosure to
potential investors, timing of offers and sales, amounts to be offered,
disqualifications for prior misdeeds by the issuer, its affiliates, or
underwriters, and limitations on pre-offering solicitations.168 In contrast
to all other exemptions, the Regulation A disclosure document is
reviewed in advance by the SEC.169 The Regulation A exemption is as
near to a registered offering as an issuer can get.170 Yet, the SEC applies
the integration doctrine to post-Regulation A offerings. If an issuer
engages in a Regulation A offering followed two months later by a Rule
506(b) offering, the two offerings may be integrated under the SEC’s
166. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d).
167. Id.
168. See id. §§ 230.251(a)–(b), .251(d), .252, .254, .262. In March 2015, the SEC divided
Regulation A into two distinct exemptions: Tier 1 for offers up to $20 million; and Tier 2 for offers
up to $50 million. See supra note 39. If securities sold in a Tier 2 offering are not to be listed on a
national securities exchange, all purchasers must either be accredited investors or be subject to
certain limitations on their investments. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions
Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release
No. 74,578, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,807-09 (Apr. 20, 2015).
169. 17. C.F.R. § 230.252.
170. It should also be noted that most states do not have a registration exemption that ties into
Regulation A. Tier 2 Regulation A offerings are exempt from state registration provisions.
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A),
80 Fed. Reg. at 21,861-62; Amendments to Regulation A: A Small Entity Compliance Guide, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/regulation-a-amendmentssecg.shtml#7 (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). If the issuer is planning a Tier 1 Regulation offering up to
$20 million with a broad marketing effort, the issuer will need to register the offering in every state
where registration is required, thus providing to prospective purchasers a full disclosure document
as well as subjecting the issuer to state review and state-based sanctions. Amendments to Regulation
A: A Small Entity Compliance Guide, supra.
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five-factor test, resulting in the loss of exemption for both offerings.171
In both cases, the investors were fully protected by the terms of the
specific exemption under which they made their purchases. The
integration doctrine added nothing to investor protection. The
doctrine would, however, if applied, invalidate two otherwise perfectly
sound capital-raising efforts, each following prescribed investor
protection provisions.
C. The Rule 504 and Rule 505 Exemptions
It is equally difficult to perceive how the integration doctrine adds
any element of investor protection for either the Rule 504 or the
Rule 505 Regulation D exemptions. Rule 504 is a fairly open-ended
exemption with neither disclosure nor purchaser qualification
conditions.172 However, the issuer cannot engage in general advertising
and solicitation, which is a major hurdle for small businesses, unless the
offering is registered under a state registration provision or is sold
exclusively to accredited investors under state accredited investor
exemptions.173 Rule 504 also has an aggregation provision that limits the
amount raised under that exemption within a twelve-month period.174
And, although Rule 504 does not itself have any mandatory disclosure
requirement, if there are any material misstatements or omissions in any
offering materials or statements, investors have remedies readily
available under federal and state antifraud provisions.175 Thus, although
Rule 504 has the least technical conditions of all exemptions, it would
challenge credibility to conclude that the SEC deliberately set out to
create an exemption that did not adequately protect investors. The
relatively low monetary ceiling, the regulatory force of state law, and the
ever-present potential application of civil, administrative, or even
criminal sanctions for disclosure failures combine to provide substantial
investor protection elements. The Rule 505 exemption goes even further
than Rule 504, with mandated disclosures to non-accredited investors,176
171. When combined, the two offerings will not be able to satisfy any exemption. The
Regulation A offering involved general advertising, forbidden for Rule 506(b), and the Rule 506(b)
offering was effected without any SEC filing, thus eliminating Regulation A as a possibility.
172. Rule 504 allows offerings up to $1 million. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504. But see Securities Act
Release No. 9973, 80 Fed. Reg. 69,786, 69,832 (Nov. 10, 2015) (proposing the elevation of the Rule
504 capital ceiling to $5 million). Rule 504 has no purchaser qualifications nor mandated disclosure
requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504.
173. Id. § 230.504(b)(1).
174. Id. § 230.504(b)(2). For the text of the aggregation provision, see infra note 192.
175. Rule 504 is regarded as a public offering, and therefore, section 12(a)(2) remedies are
available to purchasers, as well the ability to make claims under Rule 10b-5.
176. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(1) (incorporating the disclosure requirements of Rule 502(b)).
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a limit on the number of non-accredited investors,177 “bad actor”
disqualification, and prohibitions against general advertising and
solicitation178 that apply regardless of any state registrations.
D. The Intrastate Offering Exemptions
The 1933 Act left the regulation of intrastate offerings to the states.
The SEC so noted in a 1937 Interpretive Release stating that an
“[e]xemption under Section 3(a)(11), if in fact available, removes the
securities from the operation of all provisions of the Act except those of
Sections 12(2) and 17.”179 Despite the hands-off admission, the SEC
nevertheless imposes its integration doctrine on section 3(a)(11)
offerings.180 The initial basis for imposing the doctrine is the reference to
“part of an issue” in the 1933 Act’s exemption provision.181 This
semantic reed suffers from major flaws. First, the “part of an issue”
phrase is not found directly or analogously in any other registration
exemption or in the delegation of authority to the SEC to create
additional exemptions. It would be strange to conclude that the 1933 Act
intended to create an integration concept for the intrastate exemption,
but not for any other exemption. If the framers of the 1933 Act had
intended to limit the availability of exemptions under an integration
concept, it would not have been difficult to draft appropriate limiting
language. Secondly, the “part of an issue” phrase is subject to alternative
interpretations at least as plausible, and perhaps more so, than the SEC’s
position that looks at prior or subsequent offerings. The 1933 Act’s key

177. Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (limiting the offering to no more than thirty-five non-accredited
investors).
178. Id. § 230.505(b)(1)–(2)(iii) (importing the “bad actor” provisions of Rule 262 applicable
to Regulation A offerings, and incorporating the prohibition against general advertising and
solicitation of Rule 502(c)).
179. Letter of General Counsel Discussing Nature of the Exemption from Registration
Provided by Section 3(a)(11), Securities Act Release No. 1459, 1937 WL 29095 (May 29, 1937).
Sections 12(2) and 17 are antifraud provisions applicable to potential disclosure violations. See
Securities Act of 1933 §§ 12(a)(2), 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77l(a)(2), 77q (2012).
180. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c). Curiously, integration only applies to post-, not pre-Regulation A
offerings. See id.
181. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11) (“Any security which is a part of an issue offered and
sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory . . . .”). In its December 1961
Release, the Commission cited its prior Unity Gold Corp. decision, see supra note 79, indicating
that “[w]hether an offering is ‘a part of an issue’, that is, whether it is an integrated part of an
offering previously made or proposed to be made, is a question of fact and depends essentially upon
whether the offerings are a related part of a plan or program.” Section 3(a)(11) Exemption for Local
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1961 WL 61651, at *1 (Dec. 6, 1961).
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term “issue” is not defined. It is entirely plausible to consider the term
“issue” to refer to the particular, identified set of securities being offered
for sale under the intrastate exemption. Within that group of securities,
no offers or sales may be made to any non-residents. This reading is
consistent with the first interpretative question to come under
section 3(a)(11)—namely, whether an issuer undertaking a proposed
registered offering could sell some of the soon-to-be registered shares
under the intrastate exemption until the registration became effective.182
The negative answer was fundamentally consistent with the “issue”
concept, as the same securities that were being registered were also
proposed to be sold in the intrastate offering.
When one looks at the fundamental question of investor protection,
section 3(a)(11) offerings are subject to state registration requirements
when there are broad-scale marketing efforts.183 If the offerings are not
state registered, state registration exemptions generally contain investor
protection measures such as maximum numbers of investors, limiting
marketing constraints, and restrictions on commissions to sales
personnel.184 With regard to the SEC’s own Rule 147, one need go no
further than the Commission’s own statement that “adoption of the
rule . . . is in the public interest, since it will be consistent with the
protection of investors.”185
E. Integration as an Unnecessary and Potentially Harmful Doctrine
If, as appears, each registration exemption has its own set of
adequate investor protection elements, there is no policy justification for
denying the validity of one offering simply because it could be deemed
on an abstract, ambiguous basis to be “part of” or related to another
offering. The primary goal of investor protection having been met, the
integration doctrine adds nothing.186 Adding nothing would be a benign
182. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
183. See UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 202, 301 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 2005).
184. State registration exemptions tend to be very limited in terms of number of purchasers and
restraints on marketing. See id. § 202(14).
185. Notice of Adoption of Rule 147 Under the Securities Act of 1933—“Part of an Issue,”
“Person Resident,” and “Doing Business Within” for Purposes of Section 3(a)(11) of that Act,
Securities Act Release No. 5450, 3 SEC Docket 349, at *1 (Jan. 7, 1974).
186. It may be argued that by forcing issuers to engage in a registered offering, the integration
doctrine allows investors to sue for disclosure violations under section 11 of the 1933 Act—a
provision that applies only to registered offerings and allows for no defense by the issuer.
Disclosure violations in exempt offerings will generally need to be addressed in civil actions under
Rule 10b-5, which allows issuers a scienter defense. See STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES
COUNSELING FOR SMALL AND EMERGING COMPANIES chs. 19-21 (2015). Thus, it could be argued,
registration creates a greater potential benefit for investors because of the easier ability to recover if

36

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:3

effect were it not for the clear adverse impact of the doctrine
on capital financing.
Moreover, the integration doctrine may be counter-productive to
the goal of investor protection. By creating impediments to capital
formation, the integration doctrine may deny to companies the capacity
to raise capital that may be needed to strengthen the value of investments
held by existing shareholders. If the integration doctrine inhibits or
delays a company’s financing capacity, existing shareholders, as well as
creditors and employees, may suffer the economic consequences. The
formalistic integration doctrine is more than simply a hindrance—it is
antagonistic to the financial needs of smaller companies and those who
rely upon their economic capacities.187

there are disclosure violations. The argument, however, is flawed for several reasons. One is that
small businesses concerned about the potential application of the integration doctrine are very
unlikely to choose registration as an alternative, as such companies do not have the capacity to
engage in registered offerings. Secondly, purchasers in exempt offerings other than private offerings
can utilize section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act to bring actions based on disclosure violations, and it is
a provision that allows the issuer a due diligence defense, even though it is quite difficult for issuers
to defend disclosure violations on such grounds. See id. Finally, purchasers in all exempt offerings
have the full panoply of state law remedies available, both statutory and common law. Many states
have broader provisions allowing for investor actions than exist at the federal level. See id.
187. Elimination of the integration doctrine as applied to federal registration exemptions will
not affect state laws that have similar integration provisions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 516.061(c) (West 2007). The Official Commentary to the 2002 Uniform Securities Act
specifically adopts the federal integration doctrine for the limited offering exemption set forth in its
section 202(14). UNIF. SEC. ACT cmt. 15 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
2005). Some states have incorporated integration provisions into their statutes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 516.061(c). Although such provisions would remain regardless of SEC action, elimination
of the federal doctrine would nevertheless have a material impact. By far the most commonly used
federal exemption is Rule 506, which preempts state registration and exemption provisions. Based
on an SEC sponsored survey for the years 2009-2012, Rule 506 offerings constituted ninety-nine
percent of all amounts sold under Regulation D, of which more than two-thirds of those offerings
were for amounts that could have utilized Rule 504 or Rule 505 exemptions. VLADIMIR IVANOV &
SCOTT BAUGUESS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF
UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION, 2009-2012, AN UPDATE OF
THE FEBRUARY 2012 STUDY 3 (2013). During the same 2009-2012 period, there were only nineteen
Regulation A offerings, as compared to approximately 27,500 Regulation D offerings up to
$5 million (the Regulation A ceiling.) Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues
Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9497, Exchange
Act Release No. 71,120, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2493, 79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 3928 (Jan. 23,
2014). If, and when, the SEC adopts rules for the enlarged Regulation A exemption and the
crowdfunding exemption, those exemptions will also preempt state registration and exemption laws.
State integration provisions will only be applicable to a relatively small number of offerings. In nonpreempted instances, such as intrastate offerings and Rule 504 offerings, state law will usually
require registration, a costly and tedious process, which companies are not likely to undertake
without assuring that they are raising sufficient capital to meet foreseeable and contingent expenses.
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VI. LIMITED RETENTION OF THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE FOR
NUMERICALLY BASED EXEMPTIONS
The argument for elimination of the integration doctrine presumes
that most issuers that engage in multiple offerings are acting in good
faith to meet capital needs. There is, however, one instance where the
integration doctrine may be justified—namely where the exemption
specifically limits the number of purchasers. Rules 505 and 506(b) are
the only two exemptions with such limits, both of which require that
the issuer reasonably believe that there are not more than thirty-five
non-accredited investors.188 One can imagine an issuer conducting a
Rule 505 or Rule 506(b) offering that reaches the maximum thirty-five
non-accredited purchasers and then immediately embarking on another
nominally different Rule 505 or Rule 506(b) offering to additional
non-accredited potential investors. If such multiple offerings occur one
after the other, or within a relatively short time frame, the offerings
would effectively emasculate the numerical limitations. Such tactics, if
permitted, would render the numerical limitations moot.189 If numerical
limitations are to retain any force and effect, the integration doctrine will
need to apply to follow-on offerings for numerically limited exemptions
that simply parrot the initial offering. The possibility of follow-on
Rule 506 offerings that result in sales to numerous non-accredited
investors was cited by the Commission as a reason for not reducing the
integration safe harbor to thirty days as recommended by its Advisory
Committee, and instead the Commission proposed, but never adopted, a
reduction of the safe harbor time frame to ninety days.190 Adoption of
that reduced time frame would be reasonable and appropriate for
numerically based exemptions. In all other instances, the integration
doctrine should be eliminated.
188. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), .506(b)(2)(i) (2014).
189. One may appropriately question the Rule 505 and Rule 506(b) numerical limitations. The
need for such a limitation seems particularly inappropriate for Rule 506(b), as all non-accredited
purchasers are by definition sophisticated or represented by qualified purchaser representatives. It
seems quite arbitrary to limit such purchasers in any numerical way. Although Rule 505 purchasers
are not required to have the same purchaser qualifications as exist in Rule 506, the numerical
limitation in Rule 505 may also be seriously questioned. There are no numerical limitations for
either intrastate or Rule 504 offerings, which, unlike Rule 505, do not have any disclosure
requirements as a condition of the exemption. What purpose is served by limiting Rule 505 nonaccredited investors to thirty-five? The numerical limitation simply hampers companies in their
capital-raising efforts, but adds nothing of substance to investor protection concerns. If the
Commission could provide a plausible explanation for why there is a numerical limitation, or why it
is not fifty, or one hundred, perhaps the condition could be understood. As is, the numerical
condition is simply another unnecessary hindrance to financing efforts by smaller companies, many
of whom do not have access to large numbers of accredited investors.
190. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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A. Exemptions with Monetary Limitations
Three exemptions from registration have monetary ceilings: Rule
504; Rule 505; and Regulation A.191 If there is a basis for retaining the
integration doctrine for exemptions with numerical limitations, does a
similar basis apply to exemptions with monetary ceilings? The answer is
clearly no, since all of these exemptions include aggregation conditions.
Rule 504 is limited to $1 million.192 If a company uses Rule 504 to raise
$1 million, and then immediately starts another $1 million Rule 504
offering, or any other offering under a section 3(b) exemption, the
second offering would run afoul of the Rule 504 aggregation provisions.
The aggregation provisions make multiple short-term Rule 504 offerings
impossible. Aggregation would not be applicable if a Rule 504 offering
was followed by a Rule 506(b) or Rule 506(c) offering, as those rules are
not section 3(b) exemptions. However, in light of the investor protection
provisions contained in each of the respective exemptions, particularly
given the personal qualification provisions in Rule 506(b) and
Rule 506(c), there is no viable justification for integrating Rule 504 and
Rule 506 offerings. Similarly, a company is very unlikely to engage in
multiple short-term Rule 505 offerings. Rule 505 is also subject to
aggregation provisions that would limit successive Rule 505 offerings
that together exceed $5 million.193 If the company thinks that it has the
capacity to raise more than $5 million, it would be much better served by
using Rule 506(b) or Rule 506(c), which have no monetary ceilings.
Regulation A also has an aggregation provision that limits the total
amount raised under Regulation A offerings within a twelve-month
period to $5 million.194 One need not apply an integration concept to
follow-on Regulation A offerings as aggregation supplies the monetary
limit. Follow-on Rule 504 or Rule 505 offerings would run afoul of the
aggregation provisions contained within each of those rules. A follow-on
Rule 506 offering could result in more than $5 million being raised
within a twelve-month period, but the requirements for both
Regulation A and Rule 506 are so substantial, and the investor protection
elements so strong, that there is no policy justification for denying a

191. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(b), .504(b)(2), .505(b)(2)(i).
192. Id. § 230.504(b)(2) (“The aggregate offering price for an offering of securities under this
[Rule 504] . . . shall not exceed $1,000,000, less the aggregate offering price for all securities sold
within the twelve months before the start of and during the offering of securities under this [Rule
504], in reliance on any exemption under section 3(b), or in violation of section 5(a) of the
Securities Act.”).
193. Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(i).
194. Id. § 230.251(b).
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company the ability to raise additional funds in a post-Regulation A
private offering regardless of timing or purpose.
B. Related Companies
The integration doctrine has also been applied to related companies
with substantial overlapping ownership that engage in concurrent
offerings for similar business purposes.195 This is an atypical situation
that hinges principally on the question of the issuer’s true identity. If, in
fact, the apparently distinct entities have no material separate existence,
it is entirely appropriate to determine that the supposedly distinct
offerings must be combined within a single exemption. This result is
consistent with an ABA report that focused on the economic
independence of the issuers.196
VII.

CONCLUSION

The integration doctrine might be justifiable if it served a policy
goal consistent with the 1933 Act. However, that is not the case. Instead,
the doctrine is simply formalistic, inherently ambiguous, inconsistent in
application, and contrary to the broadly accepted national goals to foster
and promote small business capital formation.197 No patchwork
modification should be undertaken, such as an effort to redefine or
clarify the Commission’s five-factor test. When issuers engage in
multiple offerings within a relatively short period of time, the primary
question should be whether such offerings complied with the issuer’s
chosen exemption.198 Such an analysis would be consistent with the
Supreme Court’s admonition that, in determining the conditions for a
registration exemption, “inquiry should be on the need . . . for the
protections afforded by registration.”199 Every registration exemption
contains significant investor protection elements.200 If the Commission
believes otherwise, the proper course is to modify exemption
requirements, not to artificially join two or more distinct offerings into

195. See, e.g., Thomas H. Chambers, SEC No-Action Letter [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,618 (June 28, 1976) (denying a no-action letter for an offering by distinct
oil and gas drilling limited partnerships where there was an overlap in general partners and
contractual relationships).
196. A.B.A. Subcomm. on P’ships, Trusts and Unincorporated Ass’ns, supra note 98, at 1610.
197. See supra Part IV.
198. See supra Part V.
199. SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953).
200. See supra Part V.A–D.
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one. The Commission should recognize, and if it does not,
Congress should mandate, that the integration doctrine should be
eliminated for all but the narrowest of circumstances involving
numerically based exemptions.

